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The Rhetorical Foundation of Militant Jihad 
 
Sudhanshu Sarangi and David Canter 
Centre for Investigative Psychology, The University of Liverpool 
 
Synopsis:  Radical, violent Islam or „Militant Jihad‟ derives its authority from a particular 
set of interpretations of Islamic texts. An understanding of the essence of these interpretations 
helps to distinguish the views of militant jihadis from those of moderate Muslims. Important 
jihadi writings were therefore reviewed to establish a set of criteria that characterise the 
religious rhetoric of militant jihadis. These criteria are: a) a dismissal of the dominant, 
interpretative role of Islamic jurists by emphasising a literal interpretation of sacred texts 
with the stated objective of restoring the golden age of the Islam (salaf) b) establish the 
sovereignty of God and rule by „sharia‟ in the entire world c) a clear and uncompromising 
break with all existing or past forms of manmade systems d)to convert non-believers or ask 
then to accept an inferior citizen status; if they agree to neither, killing them would be 
justified on the grounds of faith alone e) women are inherently less favoured by God and are 
fundamentally seductive, so they must be segregated and limitations imposed on the 
interaction between sexes to maintain society‟s moral fabric. f) The establishment of Islamic 
rule is the responsibility of an enlightened vanguard, who must wage a jihad against the 
domestic apostate rulers and foreign infidel enemies.  However, the arguments for the 
overthrow of the world order through an unlimited, un-conditional and violent jihad do not 
have really thorough roots in Islamic jurisprudence and the great majority of Muslims, who 
are moderate, do not accept the rhetoric, objectives and methods of the jihadis.  
 
 
Introduction 
Islam asks its believers to follow five basic pillars of faith and action (arkân 
al-islâm):  
1. There is no deity except Allah and Muhammad is the Prophet of Allah  
(shahâdah)  
2. Performing five ritual prayers a day (salât)  
3. Giving Alms (zakât)  
4. Fasting during the holy month of Ramadan every year (sawm)  
5. Performing a pilgrimage to Mecca once in a lifetime (hajj).  
 
All Muslims agree on these five pillars of faith and are guided by one 
essential, immutable and binding scripture- „the Holy Quran‟. However, despite the 
fact that all Muslims believe in one God, the supremacy of the Quran and offer prayer 
in Arabic, interpretations and attitudes among the believers of Islam have historically 
shown a great degree of divergence, not limited to the widely known differences 
between the Sunni and Shia streams of Islamic faith. Rhetorically one group may call 
another „heretics‟ even justifying punishment and retribution resulting in bloodshed.  
Had  the Jihadi claims that their version of Islam is the only true, legitimate or 
pure Islam, been merely intellectual articulation or religious discourse Muslims and 
non-Muslims could have ignored them, but in recent years jihadi  rhetoric has 
underpinned death and destruction on an unprecedented scale creating concern for the 
stability and security of the world.  
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Absence of a proper understanding of the jihadi expression of Islam has led to 
many misconceptions. First, there is the belief that Islamic Jihad is a new ideology, or 
that the radical trend originated in the context of the Afghan war (1978-89). In fact the 
radical tendency can be traced back at least to the writings of medieval jurists like 
Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), eighteenth century evangelist 
Muhammad bin „Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791) and in modern times Hasan al-Banna 
(1906-1949), Mawlana abu al-Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979), Muhammad Ilyas (1885-
1944), Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) and many others. Both of the leaders of Al-Qaeda, 
Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahari inherited well known ideological positions.  
They are not the intellectual founding fathers of radical Islam.  
Secondly, it is often assumed that Islam is a homogenous religion, which has 
an intrinsic core that motivates Muslims to indulge in violence and disruption or 
makes them intolerant towards other faiths. Many even believe that we are witnessing, 
what Huntington (1998) has called „a clash of civilization‟ in which two monolithic 
world views are facing each other like prize-fighters. Such a perspective undervalues 
the many distinctions within the heterogeneity of this vast and multi-faceted world 
religion, the second largest after Christianity with around 1.5 billion faithful. 
Part of the confusions about Islam arise from the fact that as essentially God-
fearing people, all of whom respect the central messages of the Quran, most Muslims 
are loathe to do or say anything that implies a criticism of their religion. Most are 
therefore reluctant to take sides with those perceived as the enemies of Islam. Those 
moderates, who feel the need to defend Islam, have been trying to explain that the 
„jihadi‟ interpretation is a false or wrong interpretation of Islam and that it is unfair 
for Islam to be blamed for the belief or the work of a few extremists. However, 
careful consideration of the fundamentals of Islam does open the possibility that the 
jihadi interpretation is neither an accidental nor a false interpretation of Islam. It is 
just one of a number of possible interpretations of the religion and not the most 
authoritative. 
A crucial principle in Islam stated in Quran II: 256* is: 
„There shall be no compulsion in religion‟  
This is taken to mean that ultimately accepting or rejecting an interpretation is 
left to the conscience the believers. They alone decide at an individual level what   
expresses the true will of God. This allows Muslims to subscribe to many alternative 
positions making the religion far more pluralistic than is often assumed. Within this 
variety of opinions a majority of Islamic scholars and Muslims the world over do not 
subscribe to the jihadi interpretation.  
A third misunderstanding is to view Al Qaeda  as a synonym for militant Jihad. 
Al Qaeda is neither the first nor the only jihadi organisation in the world. The 
emphasis on Al Qaeda as the core of militant jihad ignores the many other militant 
Islamic groups that have existed in many non-Western societies over the last century. 
For example, Egypt has had to cope with violent jihadis for more than 60 years. It was 
cadres from the previously existing Egyptian Groups: Egyptian Islamic Jihad (al-jihad 
islamiya), Egyptian Islamic Group (jamma islamiyya), who joined with Mujahideens 
from Arab, Maghreb, South and Central Asia and the Far East to create Al Qaeda in 
the late 1980‟s (Sageman, 2004; Gunaratna, 2002). Furthermore, Jihadi movements 
have been active in many countries including Algeria, Indonesia, Chechnya, Pakistan 
and India and these organisations share similar ideological positions, are equally 
                                                 
*
 All quotations from the Quran are from the Penguin translation by N.J.Dawood (2003) 
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dangerous and have been responsible for equal or more deaths than those attributed to 
Al Qaeda.  
Although most of the regional jihadi movements are now overshadowed by 
the dominant presence of Al Qaeda  they had no difficulty in supporting or joining Al 
Qaeda‟s World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews, Crusaders and others, created by 
a fatwa issued on Feb 23, 1998 signed by Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, 
Abu-Yasir Ahmad Taha, Mir Hamzah and Fazlur Rahman (bin-Laden, 2005) and in 
accepting Al Qaeda‟s leadership. The World Islamic Front for Jihad is an umbrella 
organisation of jihadis from Kashmir, Chechnya, Indonesia, Algeria, Morocco, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt and Palestine for collaboration and unity. Though, the front appears to 
exist more as a networking concept and less as an organisation with identifiable 
structures.  
A fourth misunderstanding is the attempt to place various movements and 
groups in the context of regional and national boundaries. Jihad is a negation of the 
notion of nationalism. It is misleading to assume that a jihadi in Britain will have a 
different rhetoric or agenda from a jihadi in Egypt, Kashmir or Chechnya. As Sayyid 
Qutb (2007) has argued, „a Muslim has no nationality except his belief‟ (p.118). The 
word ummah in Arabic refers to the Muslim community regardless of differences of 
tribe and territory and is not related to any issue of national self-determination or the 
notion of a modern nation state as traditionally understood in Western political theory.  
 
  
The Jurists and the Activists: 
 
Unlike Canonical Law, „Islamic Law was never supported by an organized 
power‟ as Schacht (1991, p.2) a leading scholar on the subject, has stated. There is no 
church in Islam and no priesthood of the kind known to Christianity. Islamic law 
precedes the Islamic state. A Mosque is a private (non-state) institution. Thus, in 
theory at least, no one has any superior authority to interpret the religion. As a result 
„Islamic Law‟, Schacht (1991, p.3) argues, „was never „uniform at any point of its 
development‟ . Interpretation of the religion is provided by religious scholars who are 
called variously alim (or ulama), faqih, mulla , shaykh or Imam. They give their 
authoritative opinions (fatwas) on what is required (wajib) to be done, what is 
forbidden (haram), what is recommended (mandub), what is disapproved (makruh) or 
what is merely permitted (mubah). Since the jurists do not have the backing of state 
power it is ultimately left to each individual Muslim to decide from his/her conscience 
whether a fatwa  represents the will of God or not.  Fatwas “carry persuasive 
authority, but they are not mandatory or binding”, as has been argued by leading 
Islamic jurist Khaled Abou El-Fadl (1988, p.28) of the UCLA School of Law.   
Despite being a sacred law, Islamic Law was created by a process of rational 
interpretation to introduce religious standards and moral values. Secondly, Schacht 
(1991, p.4) argues it „possesses a pronounced private and individualistic character‟. 
During the Umayyad period, about the beginning of the second Islamic century, 
schools of jurisprudence developed in various important centres of Islam like Iraq and  
Medina with each school depending on, what Schacht (1991) has described their own 
living tradition‟. These traditions were established from opinions on important 
subjects of the day and on varied degree of emphasis on different roots of 
jurisprudence or usul al-fiqh. Though some of these schools have now become 
extinct, there are four extant schools called Madhhab in Sunni Islam; Hanafi, Maliki, 
Shafi and Hanbali. Similarly the Jafari and Zaydi schools guide the Shi‟is and the 
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Ismaili school survives among the Ismailis in India (Ziadeh, 1995; Schacht, 1991; 
Coulson, 1994) 
Jurists are trained in the three main sources of Islamic law. First and foremost 
is the holy Quran which Muslims believe, represents God‟s words as revealed to 
Prophet Muhammad and is a literal oral tradition. The second is the  Sunnah, which is 
also an oral tradition that roughly refers to traditions or rule by analogy; what Prophet 
Muhammad and his four Companions „said‟ or „did not say‟ or „did‟ or „did not do‟. 
Individual instances of the precedents are reported in the third source, the Hadith. 
Besides studying these sources, jurists are trained in methodologies for considering 
evidence and general principles of jurisprudence like principles of equity, public 
interest and general custom. Because of the interpretative nature of legal opinion 
multiplicity was expected and tolerated with respect. As stated by Ziadeh (1995) the 
Hanafis make liberal use of opinion in their formulations and are often called „People 
of Opinion‟ as opposed to other schools that rely on traditions of the Prophet and are 
called „People of Traditions‟.  
Taken together the three sources of law, all the legal opinions of the different 
schools of thought, along with procedural law (methodologies for considering 
evidence) and broad legal principles, are collectively called Shari‟a. After many years 
of education in a school of jurisprudence, Fadl (2006) reports that the scholars receive 
licences or permission (ijazas) from several established jurists before being accepted 
themselves as jurists. Thus, the jurists are carefully trained to interpret the law and are 
thus nearly always well respected. 
The jurisprudential tradition of interpretative law was challenged by the 
Hanabali jurist Ibn Taymiyya, who lived at a time of the Mongol conquest of the 
Abbasid Empire in 1258. Taymiyya blamed the fall of the Caliphate on a corruption 
in Islamic society brought on by interpretative and speculative readings and 
innovations (bidah) as opposed to what he viewed was the desirable method of a 
simple literal following of the Quran and the Sunnah. He wanted Muslims to restore 
the glory of Islam and the golden age when Prophet Muhammad and his four 
Companions ruled over Medina by following the pure form of Islam as represented in 
the Quran and the Sunnah and practised by the Prophet and his Companions. 
Taymiyya, thus, led the foundation for a revivalist movement that sought to go back 
to the fundamentals of the Quran for restoring the Golden age of Islam, the Salaf (the 
ancient period when Prophet Muhammad and his four Companions ruled over 
Medina). This preaching of the Salaf or Salafiyyah, as it is called, is the core of the 
contemporary Global Salafi jihad.  
Inspired by Taymiyya, the opposition to jurists became a key component of 
the discourse of modern jihadi activists like Hasan al-Banna and Sayeed Qutb, who 
argued that the Companions drank from the pure spring of Quran and Hadith unlike 
subsequent generations who used mixed sources including, as Qutb (2007) writes, 
„Greek philosophy and logic, ancient Persian legends and their ideas, Jewish 
scriptures and traditions, other religions and civilizations‟ (p. 17). The jurists had tried 
to be creative and intellectual, argued the activists. Faraj (1986), one of the most 
influential of jihadi ideologues, describes, thus: 
“The most reliable Speech is the Book of God, and the best guidance is the 
guidance of Muhammad, may God‟s peace be upon him. The worst of all things are 
novelties, since every novelty is an innovation (bidah) and every innovation is a 
deviation, and all deviation is in Hell.”(p.160) 
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The activists downplayed the need to seek the guidance of jurists since all can 
read the Quran and the Sunnah and can understand God‟s will and decide for 
themselves  (though the activists miss no opportunity to selectively quote from jurists 
as authorities to support their own claims).  They propose that, fundamentally, every 
individual is equally competent to understand God‟s will as expressed in the Quran 
and the Sunnah without unnecessary intellectualisation. This readiness for anyone to 
interpret the Hadith and issue a fatwa (more so in the age of the internet) is illustrated 
by Osama bin-Laden and his likes. Bin-Laden attended the Management and 
Economics School at King Abd al-Aziz University in Jeddah and his deputy al-
Zawahiri was trained as a physician; neither had any formal jurisprudential training or 
the necessary license to issue any fatwa . 
The literalist view of Islam undermined the guiding role of the jurists and the 
appropriation of the religious tradition by activists for the purpose of what Kepel 
(2006) has called „political Islam‟. The activists were not bound by jurisprudential 
traditions with regard to procedural law and legal principles like equity and greater 
public good.  Fadl (2006) argues, the activists indulge in „Hadith-hurling‟ i.e. widely 
quoting supporting precedents/ traditions in a selective way without considering the 
broader jurisprudential principles to advocate violence, revenge and disruption; a 
process, he describes, as a „great theft‟ of the soul of Islam and a negation of what 
Islam fundamentally stands for; peace and brotherhood.  
Qutb (2007) was opposed to the discourse in Islam being intellectualised, 
because Islam, he claimed, was for practical guidance that included a political 
programme. A Muslim was to translate Quranic instructions into action. He argued 
that the generations after the Companions used the „instruction for academic 
discussion and enjoyment‟.(p.19) In short, Qutb and the activists advocate a 
philosophy of Praxis more commonly associated with Italian Communist Antonio 
Gramsci (1995). Even before Qutb, Maulana Mawdudi(1903-1979), the founder of  
Jamaat-i-Islami in un-divided India and Hasan al-Banna(1906-1949), the founder of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt had used Islam for advocating radical political 
action (Kepel, 2006; Adams, 1983). 
As Nettler (1995) points out, the Wahabi movement and the Saudi state that 
emerged from that movement have been deeply influenced by the ideas of Hanbali 
jurist Ibn Taymiyah, particularly the emphasis on a literalist interpretation of the 
Quran and the Sunnah and the conception of Medina as the model for an Islamic state 
or salaf. Hanbali is the official school of jurisprudence of the Saudi state. The Saudi 
political and religious elite use their financial power to export their ideas around the 
world. Osama bin-Laden and the Mujahedeens fighting in Afghanistan against the 
Soviet Union enjoyed patronage and official approval of the Saudi state and the Saudi 
religious elite. Saudi Arabia was also one of the three states to recognise and establish 
full diplomatic ties with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan; the other two countries 
being United Arab Emirates and Pakistan. The Wahabis of Saudi Arabia have funded 
Madrassas, Mosques and academic activities to propagate their brand of Islam around 
the world. Wahabism has been a clear foundation for militant jihad, though since 
about 1989, the Council of Senior Ulamma of Saudi Arabia has issued fatwas 
supporting the views of the Saudi regime, who are now at odds with bin-Laden over 
stationing American forces on Saudi soil in the wake of operation Desert Storm 
(1990-91) and the latter has retaliated with fatwas issued under the auspices of the 
Advisory Reform Committee, based in London declaring jihad against the religious-
political elite of Saudi Arabia  (bin-Laden, 2005). 
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The militant jihadis come from many Islamic streams and not only from 
Wahabism. The Taliban grew out of the Madrassa network of Dar al-ulum Deoband, 
the largest Islamic seminary in the world based in India and Pakistan. Most of the 
Taliban cadres came from Deoband affiliated Madrassas in the North-West of 
Pakistan and believed in an extreme form of Deobandism preached in these 
Madrassas and the Training camps for Afghan Mujahedeens (Ahmed Rashid, 2002). 
The Taliban fugitive chief Mullah Umar and the Chief of Pakistan-based Kashmiri 
jihadi group Jaish-e-Mohammad, Maulana Masud Azhar, were the product of the 
Binouri Madrasa in Karachi, which is the largest Deobandi Madrassa in Pakistan. As 
discussed by Metcalf (1995) the Deobandi Madrassa teaches hadith and the Hanafi 
legal tradition, while adhering to Sufism for personal transformation with the help of 
spiritual guidance. But, Rashid(2002) is right in suggesting that the Taliban brand of 
Deobandism is a rather extreme example of Deobandi Islam.  
The ideologues of militant jihad mostly come from the religio-political elite in 
society and are well educated and articulate. Mawdudi was an influential journalist 
and editor of al-Jamiah. Hasan al-Banna graduated from the Dar al-Ulum College in 
Cairo, much like Sayyid Qutb after him, and went on to become a well respected 
teacher. Qutb was a senior official in the education department in Egypt. Dr. Abdullah 
Azzam, the founder of Al Qaeda, had earned a doctorate in Islamic Jurisprudence 
from Egypt‟s al-Azhar university and was a Professor before joining jihad in 
Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. Osama bin-laden belonged to one of the richest 
families in the middle-east and went to the Management and Economics School at 
King Abd al-Aziz University in Jeddah. Al-Zawahiri went to the Medical School in 
Cairo University and was a trained physician. The jihadis come from different Islamic 
traditions, but agree on a simple literal following of the Quran and the Sunnah. 
 
Establishing God’s Rule and destruction of manmade systems 
 
The theological foundation of Islam is based on accepting the monotheistic 
declaration „La ilha illa Allah‟ „There is no deity but God‟ (tawhid). This principle 
also means that rule and sovereignty or „hakimiyah‟ belong only to God (la hukm wa 
la siyadah ila lillah). Qutb (2007), one of the most representative and influential 
activists, argues:  
“The earth belongs to God and should be purified for Him unless the banner, „No 
deity except God‟, is unfurled across the earth. Man is servant to God alone, and he 
can remain so only if he unfurls the banner…..no sovereignty except God‟s, no law 
except from God, and no authority of one man over another, as the authority in all 
respects belong to God.”(p.26) 
 
The sacred law (the Shari‟a) embodies God‟s will and humans must 
completely and fully submit to the law. The consistent argument from ibn Taymiyya 
to al-Zawahiri is that Muslims have been made weak because they have diverted from 
God‟s path, and allowed themselves to be ruled by Western, mixed and man made 
laws, in effect, creating jahili  societies that are ignorant of or have deviated from 
God‟s commandments. If Ibn Taymiyya blamed the fall of the Abbasid Empire to the 
lack of Quranic rule, the later activists blame the defeat in the six-day war with Israel 
in 1967 and the continued „weakness‟ of the Muslim ummah to the failure to establish  
Sharia law and forge Muslim unity. They argue that there is no need for human laws 
since God has already expressed His will in the form of the shar‟ia and that the 
attempt by humans to give themselves a law is heretical and is against God‟s will. 
Only once a group of people who bow to God alone gain control over society (build a 
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theocratic society) they may formulate practical laws. However, in no case is any rule 
by another human being or group of persons acceptable because that is Shirk, 
ascribing the attributes, power or authority of God to others besides Him and/or 
worshipping others besides Him.  
When a Prime Minister or President is duly elected, submitting to his rule will 
be Shirk and un-Islamic. A revolt against his rule will be an appropriate religious 
duty. A law cannot become legitimate because it is framed by representatives elected 
by a majority. Javid Eqbal (1983), explaining what he sees as the Islamic position on 
democracy, states “In an Islamic state the people are not vested with ultimate 
sovereignty” and “the only principle operative is the supremacy of Islamic 
law”(p.253). Neither any majority nor any minority can have the power to make laws 
after God has expressed the law in no uncertain terms. Legitimacy belongs to God 
alone, not humans. The activists neither want Western-style democracy nor Western-
style nation states as is brought out in the writings of Mawdudi and Qutb. They want a 
theocracy in the entire world where there is rule of the Sharia  and all human 
relationships are based on, what they argue, equality subjugated to God alone.  
The establishment of God‟s rule is opposed physically by the enemies of Islam 
and the goal is, as al-Zawahiri (2006, p. 135) explains, to “topple the Government and 
establish an Islamic state” and secondly, fight against “the Jewish-US alliance”. This 
two-fold distinction between the enemies are integral to the jihadi rhetoric as is 
articulated in the writings of Faraj (1986)  , al-Zawahiri (2006)   and others and 
analysed by Marc Sageman (2004) and others. It is a distinction between firstly the 
foreign enemy, or „far enemy‟; the Infidels (the Crusaders, Zionists and others) who 
occupy/colonise Muslim land and subjugate Muslims, or prop-up un-Islamic, apostate 
regimes by proxy; America being described as the „head of the snake‟. Secondly, the 
domestic apostate rulers, or near enemy, who prevent or fail to establish the 
Government by Islamic Shariah and collaborate  with the Infidels- Crusaders, the 
Zionists and others, repressing Muslims and disseminating Western values.  
The early activists were focussed on the „far enemy‟ and „imperialism‟; but the 
later activists like Faraj (1986)   argued: 
“The basis of the existence of Imperialim in the lands of Islam are (precisely) 
these rulers. To begin by putting an end to imperialism is not a laudatory and not 
a useful act. It is only a waste of time. We must concentrate on our own Islamic 
situation: we have to establish the Rule of God supreme….There is no doubt that 
the first battlefield for jihad is the extermination of these infidel leaders and to 
replace them by a complete Islamic Order. From here we should start.” (p.193)  
 
 Faraj‟s (1986)   monograph „The Neglected Duty‟ is a classic exposition of the 
shift in focus of the jihad movement for which the concept of takfir became central. 
Takfir, literally „pronouncement of unbelief against someone‟ or loosely, 
excommunication, was justified on the ground that the domestic rulers had failed to 
establish hakimiyah or sovereignty of God, as explained by Ibraham Karawan (1995) , 
Marc Sageman(2004), Gilles Kepel(2006)  and others. This position was a reiteration 
of Qutb‟s (2007)  characterisation of contemporary Islamic society as un-Islamic and 
Mawdudi‟s (1998) argument that hakimiyah was the only legitimate system. Faraj 
(1986)  argued the domestic rulers were in apostasy and deserve to be killed. 
A further principle derived from the abandonment of man-made systems is 
the desire to establish Islamic rule wherever possible as a springboard for spreading 
Islam to the rest of the world, if necessary through hijra  (migration from a hostile 
un-Islamic jahiliyyah environment, as explained by Esposito (2002). Many of the 
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jihadis like bin-Laden, al-Zawahiri and others migrated to other countries to 
establish Islamic rule.  
 
The Jihadi programme starts with the first objective of establishing a base in 
the heart of the Islamic world. Al-Zawahiri (2006) argues:  
“Armies achieve victory only when the infantry takes hold of land. Likewise, 
the Mujaheed Islamic movement will not triumph against the world coalition 
unless it possesses a fundamentalist base in the heart of the Islamic world” 
(p. 214).  
 
In a letter dated Oct 11, 2005 to al-Zarqawi, the former head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, al 
Zawahari lays down his programme for the Iraqi resistance in a letter: 
  
“The first stage: Expel the Americans from Iraq. 
The second stage: Establish an Islamic authority or amirate, then develop it 
and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphate… 
The third stage: Extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighbouring 
Iraq. 
The fourth stage: It may coincide with what came before: the clash with 
Israel, because Israel was established only to challenge any new Islamic 
entity.”(p. 255-256) 
 
The only time the jihadis came close to pursuing their programme 
successfully was when they came to power in Afghanistan and Chechnya. The 
jihadi programme is the same whether it is for regional movements like in 
Chechnya, Kashmir and Algeria or the heart of the struggle in Palestine and the 
Arabian Peninsula: control a territory, establish Islamic rule in the territory and 
export jihad to the remaining part of the world until the rule of God and Sharia  is 
established in the entire world and, as they see it, the „struggle will continue till the 
day of the final judgment‟ i.e. for as long as it takes (e.g. Al Zawahari 2006).  
  
The surrender of rationality 
 
The basis of Islamic law making is the well recognised concept of „ijtihad‟, which 
means the exercise of independent judgment by a person with sufficient knowledge.  
The literalist interpretation limits the scope of independent judgment. As Fadl (2006)   
argues rhetorically, God gave human beings aql, the ability to reason. But, if the 
extremist view of Islamic law is to be accepted: 
 
“God did not leave much space for human beings to apply their rational faculties 
since God unequivocally resolved most matters for human beings and all that is 
left is for humans to obey…. it would make little sense for God to reward the 
effort, if all God expects of us on most matters is blind obedience…..Muslims 
become like mechanized robots.” (p. 158-159) 
 
The scope of law making is further limited by the desire to replicate the society 
of earlier times to the total exclusion of all contemporary systems since the latter 
embody human creativity and ingenuity. Nothing of the manmade traditions, 
institutions and the law can be salvaged, if they are contrary to the literalist 
interpretation of Islam. The shura system of theocratic government does not contain a 
detailed theory of Governance and ends up at best as a just and benevolent 
dictatorship that functions through periodic consultation with a council of religious 
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scholars. Moreover, the argument of an unlikely over-throw of all rules by humans, 
taken to its logical conclusion, can only lead to anarchy.   
The moderates are concerned that extremists are projecting Islam as a system 
fundamentally against the universal values of democracy and human rights. Fadl 
(2006) argues that Islam is not opposed to democracy, human rights and a tolerant 
social culture. But, such reconciliation is possible only if Islam is interpreted keeping 
in mind the broader jurisprudential principles of equity, historical context and the best 
interests of human beings (tahqiq masalih al-„ibad). For moderate Muslims there is 
no reason to give up rationality, which formed the basis of a rich and varied 
jurisprudential tradition of interpretative law, in favour of a literalist construction of 
Islam which projects the universal values of democracy, human rights and moderation 
as un-Islamic.  
 
 
Western Culture and Jahiliya 
Jahiliyyah (Newby, 2006, p.112) is often contrasted with the word Islam to 
mean all the values that are opposite to Islam, referring to the period before the rise of 
Islam; a state of ignorance of the divine commandments; It is the antonym of 
knowledge (ilm), good behaviour and kindness (hilm). Islam is expected to have a 
transformative effect on the believer so that the believer emerges from the state of 
jahiliya  into a world of wisdom, knowledge and morality.  
The state of affairs before Allah revealed the law to Prophet Muhammad was 
called Jihiliya. Qutb (2007) used this quranic concept to characterise not merely 
ancient times before Islam, but the contemporary world as well. So, both the non-
Muslim and contemporary Muslim societies, he called jahili. When an individual 
becomes a believer he has to, Qutb argues, make a complete break from Jahiliyyah. 
He has to accept divine law, oneness of God and complete submission to God. He 
cannot have compromises or „give and take‟ with the jahili society. For Qutb the only 
source of culture, belief and practices has to be pure Quran without any dilution or 
influence, either Western or Oriental.  
The view that there can be hybrids in the form of „Islamic Democracy‟ or 
„Islamic Socialism‟ or that with a slight change the current political and economic 
systems can become acceptable to Islam, to Qutb, are unnecessary attempts at 
appeasement, since no such compromise is possible. He argued that even the slightest 
non-Islamic influence can „pollute the clear spring of Islam‟. Islamic society requires 
a radical revolution- a clear break with current beliefs, culture and ways. People are 
not Muslims as long as they live the life of Jahiliyyah even if they perform prayer five 
times a day, fast during Ramadan, offer zakat and perform Haj. Qutb (2007)   writes: 
 “Islam cannot accept any mixing with Jahiliyyah, either in its concept or in the 
modes of living which are derived from this concept. Either Islam will remain, 
or jahiliyyah; Islam cannot accept or agree to a situation which is half-Islam 
and half-Jahiliyyah….Command belongs to God, or otherwise Jahiliyyah; 
God‟s Shariah will prevail, or else people‟s desires.” (p. 130)  
Qutb, then goes on to say that „the foremost duty of Islam in this world is to depose 
jahiliyyah from the leadership of man, and to take the leadership into its own hands‟ 
(p.131). The idea that Western society is superior to the Islamic society despite its 
jahili character is countered by Qutb: 
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“Look at this capitalism with its monopolies, its usury and whatever else 
is unjust in it; at this individual freedom, devoid of human sympathy and 
responsibility for relatives except under the force of law; at this 
materialistic attitude which deadens the spirit; at this behaviour, like 
animals, which you call „Free mixing of the sexes; at this vulgarity which 
you call „emancipation of women‟, which are contrary to the demands of 
practical life; and at Islam, with its logic, beauty, humanity and 
happiness, which reaches the horizons to which man strives but does not 
reach.” (p.139) 
 
Qutb‟s arguments are nuanced when it comes to Western science and 
scholarship. Islamists accept that Muslim society needs to learn the pure sciences like 
Physics, Engineering, Medicine, Mathematics, and Biology in which the West has 
made significant progress. But Muslims must keep away from liberal arts like 
Political Science and Philosophy, since they contain un-Islamic ideas and are sinful. 
They must even keep away from any aspect of science like Darwinian Theory of 
evolution and Freudian Psycho-analysis which are not based on a strict empirical 
foundation and are opposed to Islamic beliefs.  
Further, any learning on matters of faith, religion, morality and value must be 
from Muslims since the non-believers always conspire to turn the believer away from 
the latter‟s faith. 
 “Many among the People of the Book wish, through envy, to lead you back to 
unbelief.” (Quran 2:109).  
“You will please neither the Jews nor the Christians until you follow their 
faith.” (Quran 2:120).  
Qutb (2007) and other activists argue that Western science fought with the 
Church and therefore there is hostility between Religion and science in the Western 
world, which is turning the West against Islam as well. But Islamic Science is a part 
of faith and does not question faith. 
The Islamists argue that there is a deliberate conspiracy for Western cultural 
invasion through art forms, fashion, media and the market, all of which are controlled 
by the West so that Muslims are separated from an appropriate puritanical cultural 
life. They fear that through these invasions the West will make sure that Muslim 
society cannot get away from jahiliyya  and will consequently remain weak and away 
from the Salaf. Muslim society must insulate itself from all such pernicious 
influences and cultural invasions. 
As with other fundamentalist religions, such as ultra-orthodox Jews, or the 
Amish in Pennsylvania, the Islamists believe they must insulate Muslims from the  
Global village by blocking TV channels, the Internet, most art forms and by ensuring 
„intellectual insularity‟. Fadl(2006)  argues that the extremists have a desire just to be 
different as a way of assertion against modernity. For example, toothpaste is un-
Islamic, which puritans claim, should not be used because Prophet Muhammad did 
not use it. The logic is Muslims must do everything possible to maintain a separate 
identity. The Islamists alienate themselves from modernity by imagining a perfect 
past. Fadl (2006) writes: “The more alienating modernity became, the more they 
idealized the past; and more idealized the past, the more undesirable the modern age 
became.”(p. 174)  
Dealing with non-believers 
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The second part of the declaration „La Ilha illa Allah‟ (There is no deity 
except Allah) is the declaration „Muhammadar Rasul Allah‟- Muhammad is the 
Messenger of God. Muslims believe that Allah sent 124,000 prophets for guidance 
ending with Prophet Muhammad with whom the chain of prophethood and 
messengership ends and religion stands perfected for the entire universe. Like the 
great majority of religions Islam claims the only way to salvation. Therefore, it is said 
that people guided by the Abrahamic Prophets like Moses and David and Jesus should 
convert to Islam and follow the latest and the best law rather than old laws that stand 
abrogated by the will of God. The only way to save non-Muslims and Muslims who 
do not practice Islam from being damned is to convert both to true Islam and make 
them follow the Shar‟ia.  
Activists like Qutb, Faraj and others use the believer- nonbeliever dichotomy 
to turn the world into one of permanent conflict and war and this dichotomy lies at the 
core of the jihadi rhetoric. A territory in which Islamic rule is established (rule of the 
Sharia) becomes the abode of Islam or dar al-Islam and the rest of the world is Dar 
al-Harb or Dar al-Kafir (the abode of infidels). So long as Sharia rule is not 
established even a Muslim land cannot be called dar al-Islam.  
A Muslim can have only two relationships with Dar al-harb; peace with a 
contractual agreement or war. But, even peace with contractual agreement ends on an 
agreed date or because of violation of contractual obligations, thereafter the 
relationship is only of war. A Non-Muslim, if he declines to accept Islam will be 
given a different status as a citizen called dhimma status. He will not be entitled to 
hold senior posts in the Government or the Army, his place of worship will be lower 
than a Mosque and he will pay a poll tax, called jijiya, though he will be exempt from 
paying Zakat, which will be compulsory for Muslims. If he refuses to be converted to 
Islam or violates his dhimma status he will be at war with the Islamic state. 
Moderates like Fadl (2006) argue that the Quran does not dichotomise the 
world into dar al-Islam and dar al-harb. The only distinction made is between the 
abode of the Hereafter and the abode of earthly life. In fact, the moderates cite a set of 
verses from the Quran that talk about respect for people of the scriptures (Christianity, 
Judaism), often referred to as Salam verse. 
 “Be courteous when you argue with the People of the Book, except with those 
among them who do evil. Say: „We believe in that which has been revealed to us 
and which was revealed to you. Our God and your God is one. To Him we 
submit.”  (QURAN 29:46). 
 
In case of any disagreement with people of other faiths, Muslims should act to assure 
their opponents that their disagreement is not personal, and that Muslims do not bear a 
grudge or enmity toward their opponent and the appropriate response is to wish their 
opponents the bliss of peace. (QURAN 25:63; 28:55; 43:89). 
As argued by Fadl (2006) and the moderates, the Quran does not preclude the 
possibility that peoples of other faith, who adhere to their religion, may also attain 
salvation and does not support any arrogance on the part of Muslims in dealing with 
non-Muslims. The dispute, if any, is to be resolved by God and not humans: 
 “It is no concern of yours whether He will forgive or punish them. They are 
the wrongdoers…He pardons whom He will and punishes whom He pleases. God is 
forgiving and merciful” (QURAN 3:128-29).  
The reaction of the jihadis to the moderation of the Salam verses is to recite 
the first part of the Sword verse 
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 “When the sacred months are over, slay the idolaters wherever you find them. 
Arrest them, besiege them, and lie in ambush everywhere for them.” (QURAN 9:5). 
The sword verse is frequently quoted by the jihadis to justify killing of non-
Muslims on the ground of faith alone. The second part of the verse, which they do not 
quote, says “If they repent and take to prayer and render the alms levy, allow them to 
go their way. God is forgiving and merciful”.  
There are many religions that call upon their believers to take to proselytising, 
but in modern times no one talks about proselytising with a sword. Islam also has a 
set of verses that advocate toleration:  
“ Believers, Jews, Sabaeans and Christians – whoever believes in God and the 
Last Day and does what is right-  shall have nothing to fear or regret”. (Quran 5:69).  
A large number of other verses in the Quran advocate toleration and respect 
for people of other religious faith (e.g. Quran 2:62, 22:34, 3:199), but the jihidis 
disregard these verses or claim that they are not relevant to our times and have been 
„abrogated‟ by God during jihad. Fadl (2006)   argues that anything the jihadis find 
inconsistent with their rhetoric is dismissed so that they can avoid responsibility for 
acting in a manner inconsistent with the Quran.  The Quran contains both the sword 
verses and the salam verses and it is a matter of emphasis and interpretation by 
believers which one to advocate.  
Status of Women  
 
The coming to power of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan unveiled to the world 
one of the worst forms of patriarchy and forced segregation of women. The Jihadis 
had shown how women are treated in the righteous Islamic State under the rule of the 
Sharia and the Muslim ullama. The status of women in Afghanistan under the 
Taliban, which pursued an extreme form of Deobandism, was very close to the 
puritanical Wahabi conservative standpoint on women, though the Taliban took the 
puritanical logic to hitherto unseen extremes. The main features of the extremist 
position on women are:  
Firstly, God favoured men and women unequally since He wanted them to 
perform different duties in life. Any violation of the principle of inequality is a 
rebellion against God. God favoured men more than women and women should 
accept their status as the will of God.  
 Secondly, while inequality is denied to women, dignity and justice are ensured.  
Thirdly, women are inherently seductive and unless men are protected from being 
seduced by women and vice versa, moral fabric in society will be torn apart or there 
will be what is called fitnah in society. Fitnah refers to a state of discord and also a 
trial or temptation that takes believers away from the ways of God. Unless men are 
protected from sexual lust they will be seduced and land up in hell. So, to protect men 
from being damned restrictions have to be imposed on women and on inter-mixing of 
sexes. Thus, by wearing the hijab and keeping away from the public, women can be 
protected from the lustful eyes of men and from being exposed to molestation and 
rape. Respect for women requires women not becoming objects of lust and desire for 
men other than their husbands by maintaining modesty in clothing and manners. 
These ideas connect with the view that family is the basis of society and the basis of 
the family is the division of labour between husband and wife. There is no greater 
work for women than bringing up children for which God specifically favoured 
women. Looking after children is the duty God gave to women and they must perform 
this duty faithfully. 
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The jihadi discourse claims moral superiority of Islamic society for the greater 
respect that women receive and for the preserving of family as an institution for the 
moral upbringing of society. Qutb (2007)  claims:      
“…if the relationship between man and woman is based on lust, passion and 
impulse, and the division of work is not based on family responsibility and 
natural gifts; if woman‟s role is merely to be attractive, sexy and flirtatious, and 
if woman is freed from her basic responsibility of bringing up children; and if, on 
her own or under social demand, she prefers to become a hostess or a stewardess 
in a hotel or ship or air company, thus spending her ability for material 
productivity rather than in the training of human beings,…then such a civilization 
is backward from the human point of view, or „jahili‟ in the Islamic 
terminology”(p. 98) 
 Much of the conservative view on status of women is influenced by the 
preaching of Abd al-Wahab (1703-1791) and subsequent generations of Wahabi 
Mullahs. The rhetoric is a compilation of all that can be said demeaning women; 
confining them to the home, placing them under the veil and justifying dominance of 
their male relatives. These practices are regarded as essential to maintain the moral 
fabric of society.  
On the other hand, the view of Moderates like Fadl (2006)  on the role of 
woman is to understand Islam in its historical context as a reform movement and to 
say that there is no restriction on further reform consistent with the essential 
principles of Islam as a religion that cares for humanity and strives for morality and 
beauty. They argue that one of the first acts of the Prophet was the prohibition of 
female infanticide. But, generally women were given various rights as a response to 
demands raised by them before Prophet Muhammad in course of the latter‟s 
leadership over the umma . 
Many of these changes were revolutionary in the medieval historical context. 
For example in place of maintaining harems, men were asked not to marry more than 
four women. Buying and selling of women was declared immoral and sexual desires 
were brought within the institution of family for the stated reason of providing 
women greater economic security. Women were given maintenance rights. „Idda‟ 
(waiting period for a woman after divorce before she can remarry) was limited to 
twice, i.e., men can no longer make women wait more than twice before re-marrying. 
The purpose of the reform measures was to ensure that women are not repressed and 
are allowed to pursue the ways of God. Whenever women raised issues of repression 
before Prophet Muhammad he responded in a manner to stop repression. Several 
verses in the Quran make clear that men and women are to be treated as equal.  
(Quran 3: 195, 4:124, 16:97, 40:40, 33:35, 49:13 etc) 
 
“Those who submit to God and accept true Faith; who are devout, sincere, 
patient, humble, charitable, and chaste; who fast and are ever mindful of God- on 
these, both men and women, God will bestow forgiveness and a rich recompense.” 
(Quran 33:35) 
 
To the extremists claim that the Islamic state should compel and coerce all 
women to wear the veil and maintain modesty, the moderates argue that the veil is not 
Islamically mandated. It should be a woman‟s autonomous decision whether to wear 
the veil or not, and that her choice be respected. Quran preaches that there ought to be 
no compulsion in religion. Toleration is fundamental to Islam. The use of force to 
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segregate women, preventing them from basic education or prohibiting them from 
contributing to productive activity are all „compulsions‟ and hence not Islamic.  
 
It is nonetheless misleading to suggest that the moderates have a totally Western 
egalitarian view of women. They   still expect women to maintain a level of modesty 
and family value, but they do not want to keep women away from education and the 
workplace. They cite the case of Aisha, one of Prophet Muhammad‟s wives who led 
troops into battle and played an important role in interpreting the religion after the 
death of the Prophet. Even though polygamy is permitted in the Quran in the context 
of a warring medieval society, with the condition that a man must be able to afford it, 
polygamy is neither mandatory nor a religious duty. Tunisia has made Polygamy 
illegal on Islamic grounds i.e., Islam‟s egalitarian core and Turkey has banned it as 
part of secularism and modernity. Most other Muslim societies have used various 
religious interpretations to restrict Polygamy, though they have not been able to 
declare it illegal altogether like Tunisia and Turkey.  
Jihad and Terrorism 
The revival of the „Salaf‟, the establishment of the rule by the „Sharia‟, the 
clear break from „jahiliya‟, over-throwing the rule by humans, are the duty of all 
human beings on whose behalf a vanguard assumes responsibility. The preferred 
method of the vanguard is dawah (peaceful missionary preaching) so that people can 
be transformed out of Jahiliya to accept the rule of God alone. But, dawah threatens 
the established domestic as well as international order, making repression of the 
vanguard inevitable. The jihadis argue that even when the vanguard has an electoral 
victory as with Al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya in Algeria in 1992 or Hamas‟s victory in the 
2006 Palestine election; it will not be accepted by the world order. Thus, a pre-
requisite for the revival of the Salaf is the annihilation of all physical opposition from 
a) domestic apostate rulers repressing the vanguard, b) infidels sponsoring the 
apostate regimes by proxy or by occupation, and c) the Crusaders, the Zionists and 
others who have declared war against the Muslim ummah. So, in defence the 
vanguard has to fight against all oppositions and launch an armed struggle, which 
they call „jihad‟ using a Quranic concept. 
The initial focus of the Jihad Movement was the „defence of Muslim Land‟ 
from occupation by non-Muslims.  Dr Abdullah Azam(2008), Jordanian religious 
scholar of Palestinian descent and founder of al-Qaeda and one of the founders of 
Hamas, who is generally described as the „Emir or Godfather of global jihad‟ 
(Esposito, 2002, p.7), issued a fatwa against the Russians after they invaded 
Afghanistan in 1979 titled “Defence of the Muslim Lands: the first obligation after 
Iman.”  Iman refers to „both an inner state‟ and an „outward expression‟ as a „proof of 
faith‟(Newby, 2006, p.100). Azam‟s fatwa was supported by Abd al-Aziz Bin Bazz, 
then Chief Mufti of the Council of Senior Ullama of Saudi Arabia. So, jihad is a 
fundamental religious duty of all Muslims, almost a sixth pillar of faith. Azam (2008) 
starts his fatwa with a quotation from Ibn Taymiya: "The first obligation after Iman is 
the repulsion of the enemy aggressor who assaults the religion and the worldly 
affairs". (p.1)  
The position that jihad is a duty to fight foreign occupation, as argued by Azam, is 
different from the primary focus of the Egyptian groups like the Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad and Egyptian Islamic Group on the apostasy of domestic rulers and takfir. Faraj, 
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for example extensively quotes Ibn Taymiyah‟s fatwas in his „Neglected Duty‟ to 
declare war against the Egyptian regime. He finds the current rulers no different from 
the invading Mongols that Taymiyah was concerned about. Faraj (1986) writes: 
“The Rulers of this age are in apostasy from Islam. They were raised at the tables 
of imperialism, be it Crusaderism, or Communism, or Zionism. They carry 
nothing from Islam but their names, even though they pray and fast and claim to 
be Muslims….It is a well established rule of Islamic Law that the punishment of 
an apostate will be heavier than the punishment of an infidel…For instance, an 
apostate has to be killed in all circumstances….The Mongols and their likes-the 
equivalent of our rulers today….Whosoever doubts whether they should be 
fought is more ignorant of the religion of Islam.” (p.169) 
  
Osama bin-Laden and the Al Qaeda were influenced by the Egyptian groups 
and the latter‟s ideologues like Qutb and Faraj. Osama bin-Laden‟s August 23 1996 
fatwa  titled “Expel the Polytheists from the Arabian peninsula” includes takfir and 
apostasy of the domestic rulers as the first justification and allowing the occupation 
by infidels as the second justification for jihad against the Saudi regime. Bin-Laden 
(2005) gives the following justification:  
“1. Its suspension of the rulings of the Islamic law and replacement thereof with 
man-made laws, and its entering into a bloody confrontation with the righteous 
scholars and pious youth. May God sanctify whom He pleases. 
2. Its inability to protect the land and its allowing the enemies of God to occupy it 
for years in the form of the American Crusaders, who have become the principal 
reason for all aspects of our land‟s disastrous predicament.”(p.28)  
 
Jihad against the infidels is based on the dichotomous division of the world, into 
two perennially warring abodes; the abode of Islam (dar al Islam) and the abode of 
the Infidels (dar al Harb), and people into believers and non-believers. This 
dichotomous division, as explained by Fadl (2006), is derived not from the Quran or 
the Sunnah, but from the work of classical Islamic jurists, who came up with this 
distinction to deal with the requirements of a medieval world where countries in 
Europe, the Middle East and Asia went to war routinely, signed peace treaties and 
plundered the weak. Some classical jurists even thought up other abodes like the 
abode of non-belligerence or neutrality (dar al- sulh, or al-„ahd) and the abode of 
justice (dar al-„adl). But, these divisions, relevant to medieval times, have become the 
basis for declaring jihad against non-believers in the modern world.   
The Jihadi view on the sword verse urging the killing of non-believers on the 
grounds of faith alone is in disregard of the Salam verses that preach toleration and 
peace. Islam regards killing of one human being as the killing of the entire humanity 
and, as with the Old Testament proclaims that saving the life of one as saving the life 
of all humanity. (Quran 5:32).  The holy Quran says: 
 
 “Show forgiveness, speak for justice, and avoid the ignorant” (Quran 7:199).  
 
Fadl (2006) argues that the jihadis “entirely ignore the Quranic teaching that the 
act of destroying or spreading ruin on this earth is one of the gravest sins possible- 
fasad fi al-ard, which means to corrupt the earth by destroying the beauty of creation” 
(p.237). Even going by the jihadi logic it is expected that the non-believers have to be 
given the option of conversion or accepting dhimma status, before declaring an 
offensive jihad.  
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The primary focus of the Jihad against the infidel is the state of Israel, which is 
said to have been created as part of a conspiracy to perpetually occupy Palestine, 
specifically Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. The defeats of the Arab world in the 
wars against Israel in 1948 was projected by Hasn al-Banna, the founder of the 
Muslim brotherhood, as a result of weakness of the Muslim ummah because of not 
following true Islam of Prophet Muhammad and his Companions. The defeat in the 
six days war in 1967 of the combined forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq at the 
hands of Israel marked a decisive shift in the polemics of the Jihadi movement. 
Firstly, the claim of the Arab nationalists that they were prepared to „throw Israel and 
those behind Israel into the sea‟ (al-Zawahiri, 2006, p. 64) the third time there was a 
war (the first two wars were in 1948 and 1956) came to be ridiculed by the jihadi 
ideologues, who also argued that peace efforts with Israel would be futile. In Azzam‟s 
words: “Jihad and the rifle alone: no negotiations, no conferences, and no dialogues.” 
(Quoted in Esposito, 2002, p.7)  
The Government of Gamal Abdel Naser, had in the mid- 60s, arrested activists 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in their thousands and executed its top leaders like Qutb 
in order to suppress the Islamic activists. After the war Naser was discredited on the 
Arab streets and blamed for the defeat. The jihadis like al- Zawahiri (2006) claim „the 
death of abd-al-Nasir..was also the death of his principles‟(p.51). Anwar Sadat, after 
succeeding Naser, released many of the Islamic activists and tried to appease the 
Islamists. A new dimension was added when Sadat signed a peace treaty with the 
state of Israel with the mediation of the Americans (Camp David peace deal, 1979). 
There were several attempts by the activists to capture power and create an Islamic 
state in Egypt as part of which Sadat was assassinated on Oct 6, 1981. Since then the 
Egyptian state has left no stone unturned in suppressing the Jihadis and even the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad has now made peace with the Egyptian regime. But, the anti-
Zionist character continues to be fundamental in the justification of Jihad against the 
infidels. 
    The initial rhetoric against the West was that the West had created and supported 
Israel. The situation changed when the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan. Jihadis 
from all over the Arab world reached Pakistan and joined the Afghan war in the 
„jihad to defend Muslim land‟. For a while the West was not the principal focus. Once 
the Jihadis defeated a Super power with the largest ground force and American forces   
made a hasty retreat in Somalia in 1993, the jihadis claimed that God was on their 
side. The regional movements in Israel, Kashmir, Morocco, Sudan, Chechnya, 
Indonesia etc were now intensified. For the Jihadis the world was their stage, they had 
arrived and the war was now against the world order led by „the United States and the 
global Jewish Government‟ (al-Zawahiri, 2006, p.125).  
 
In 1998 bin-Laden and others issued a fatwa (bin-Laden, 2005)  which is 
significant not merely because it provided a broad base for the Jihadi movement by 
the creation of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews, Crusaders and 
others, but also because it made a case for an all out, unrestricted offensive war, 
moving beyond the notion of jihad to defend Muslim land‟. The fatwa begins with the 
sword verse and goes on to state the most aggressive intent. 
“To kill the American and their allies- civilians and military- is an individual 
duty incumbent upon every Muslim in all countries, in order to liberate the al-
Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Mosque from their grip, so that their armies leave all 
the territory of Islam, defeated, broken, and unable to threaten any Muslim. This 
is in accordance with the words of God Almighty.” (Bin-Laden, 2006, p. 61) 
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The killing of civilians- non-combatants; women, even people of old age and 
children; almost any one, can now be part of Jihad. The argument, as al-Zawahiri 
(2006) makes clear is that civilians have willingly voted for their Governments and 
are accountable for the misdeeds of their Governments. Further, civilians pay taxes 
that fund the so called „war against terror‟ and occupation of Muslim lands that has 
led to the death and repression of Muslim men, women and children. Al Qaeda‟s 
further justification, as best represented in the writings of al Zawahiri (2006), is „the 
need to inflict the maximum casualties against the opponent, for this is the language 
understood by the west, no matter how much time and effort such operations take‟. 
(p. 223) Beginning with the notion of jihad to defend Muslim land the rhetoric now is 
for an all-out, no-holds-barred offensive jihad „to kill the American and their allies- 
civilians and military‟ and to take revenge for Muslim deaths, without any further 
conditionality or limitation. This killing is declared a religious duty.  
The call for Jihad, including the so called martyrdom missions (generally 
called suicide missions) also involves the fulfilment of the personal desire to make 
one eligible for God‟s munificence. A death for an Islamic cause, jihadis argue, 
entitles a believer to privileges and rights. Since death is unavoidable, it is preferable 
that a believer dies fighting for Islam and receives the rewards of God rather than 
waiting for death to come on its own. In fact, the martyr does not die and is treated 
with care and respect in God‟s garden. Among the verses of the Quran quoted 
frequently by the jihadis are the following: 
“Never think that those who were slain in the cause of God are dead. They are 
alive, and well provided for by their Lord; pleased with His gifts and rejoicing that 
those they left behind, who have not yet joined them, have nothing to fear or regret; 
rejoicing in God‟s grace and bounty. God will not deny the faithful their reward.” 
(Quran 3:169-171)  
The martyrs are treated with milk, honey and grapes and enjoy eternal youth 
with virgins (Quran 55:54 to 56, 56: 12 to39). The jihadis justify their activities in the 
name of defending Islam; at the same time it becomes an individual religious duty, 
which will entitle the jihadi to the benefits of God‟s generosity and the promised 
heaven. The critique of the jihadi articulation by the moderates is not the secular 
rationalist assertion that there is no evidence for life after death or that there is no 
heaven. The moderates argue that the activists have no competence to issue fatwa  and 
that global jihad has no Islamic justification. Further, accepting someone in heaven is 
a decision that can be taken by God alone in the Hereafter and that there are several 
ways to attain the garden and jihad is not the only way. Fadl (2006) argues that the 
Quran uses the term qital to describe war, which can never be holy; it is either 
justified or unjustified. But, either way, war is not a desirable activity. The Quran 
teaches peace and moderation, tolerance and the avoidance of war. There are many 
verses in the Quran that preach peace and toleration rather than war and blood shed. 
The Quran says: 
“If they incline to peace, make peace with them, and put your trust in God.” 
(Quran 8:61) 
 In fact, moderate jurists like Fadl (2006) contend that Islamic law treats 
attacks on non-combatants in order to terrorize, including kidnapping, hostage-taking, 
mutilation, and torture as the crime of hiraba  (waging war against society), which are 
specifically prohibited. „In the modern age‟, Fadl writes, „terrorism is the 
quintessential crime of corrupting the earth‟ (p.237). 
Recent Developments  
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The Jihadi objective is still the establishment of a Muslim state in the heart of the 
Islamic world, and to progressively revive the fallen caliphate and the glory of the 
Salaf. However, the focus of the movement has shifted away from the „near enemy‟ 
to the „far‟ enemy. As al-Zawahiri(2006) writes , 
 “The Crusaders alliance led by the United States will not allow any Muslim force to 
reach power in the Arab countries…. Confining the battle to the domestic enemy, 
(within the Arab states), will not be feasible in this stage of the battle” (p.201). 
 
  Jihad is now projected as a universal battle against the United States and its 
allies, Israel, Russia, India and international organisations like the United Nations, the 
Western Multi-national Corporations, the international communications and data 
exchange systems, the international news agencies and satellite channels and even 
international relief agencies (al zawahiri, 2006, p.201). Moreover, contemporary 
Jihad makes no distinction between combatants and non-combatants despite the view 
of a majority of Muslim scholars that Islam cannot be interpreted to justify such an 
unlimited and universal terrorist movement, particularly indiscriminate killing of 
civilians. 
 The focus on the far enemy is a result of the US led „global war on terror‟ as 
much as a realisation that global jihad now faces domestic opposition. The Council of 
Senior Ulamna of Saudi Arabia, headed by the former Chief Mufti bin-Baz, was 
targeted for condemnation by Osama bin Laden in a statement issued on December 
29 1994, in which bin-Laden accuses bin-Baz of allowing state repression and further 
that „this has not only happened in your knowledge and with your silence, but as a 
result of your judicial decrees‟ (bin-Laden, 2005, p.5). Bin-Laden and al-Qaeda 
continue to   fight the Saudi regime and the Saudi Wahabi religious elite.  
In Egypt imprisoned leaders of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya or in short Jamaa 
Islamiya (Egyptian Islamic Group), which began a violent campaign in the 1970s 
based on the concept of takfir and whose leader Abu-Yasir Rifai Ahmad Taha was 
one of the signatories to the 1998 fatwa forming the world Islamic front (bin-Laden, 
2005, p.69), denounced violence in 1997 and announced a unilateral cessation to 
violent operations on religious grounds (Sageman, 2004; al-Zawahiri, 2006). The 
Jamma had carried out large scale violent attacks in the 1990s resulting in the 
imprisonment of more than 20,000 activists. The Egyptian Government refused to 
enter into any dialogue with the Jamma, which was crippled by the imprisonment of 
its top leaders and migration of many out of Egypt. But, over a period of time the 
peace initiative has produced an active theological dialogue, particularly with the 
Azhari seminary. In 2001/2002 the Jamaa published a series of four books entitled 
„Correction of Understanding‟, which lays down the foundation of what is called a 
„new theology‟ that supports a non-violent approach to Islamic movements (El-Awa, 
2006). As might be expected, former Egyptian Jihadi leaders like al Zawahari (2006) 
have criticised the peace initiative. 
After 2001, Pakistan, a country ruled for a long time by a military-mullah 
alliance and supporting jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir, joined the US-led war on 
terror. The jihadis, in retaliation, have carried out three unsuccessful attempts to kill 
General Musharaf and have started a violent campaign against the security forces, 
particularly in the North-western tribal areas, now under the control of the Pakistani 
Taliban. The moderate parties have come together to partially restore democracy and 
to fight terrorism; in the process Benazir Bhutto was killed. The religious political 
parties were routed in the 2008 Pakistan General elections. 
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On Feb 25 2008 the Darul Uloom Deoband, the largest Islamic seminary in 
the world, held an anti-terrorism conference, which was attended by 6000 Deobandi 
Imams. At the end of the conference the Deobandis issued a fatwa stating that 
terrorism is not Islamic:  
“Islam is the religion of mercy for all humanity. It is the fountainhead of 
eternal peace, tranquillity, security. Islam has given so much importance to 
human beings that it regards the killing of a single person the killing of the 
entire humanity, without differentiation based on creed and caste. Its teaching 
of peace encompasses all humanity. Islam has taught its followers to treat all 
mankind with equality, mercy, tolerance, justice. Islam sternly condemns all 
kinds of oppression, violence and terrorism. It has regarded oppression, 
mischief, rioting and murdering among severest sins and crimes.” (p.1)   
 
Conservative Islam was never the favoured religion of the masses, who were 
condemned as „jahils‟ (ignorant people) by the elite. Consider the following 
examples. Fundamentalists prohibit all forms of singing and dancing. Watching TV is 
considered un-Islamic except when Islam is being preached. Reading a story book or 
watching a play or a movie is un-Islamic since they are lies. Offering a flower to a 
lady is un-Islamic. Standing up in honour of someone is un-Islamic since no one 
except God should be honoured. Muslims are forbidden from clapping since no one 
except God should be praised. Celebrating a birthday, including that of Prophet 
Muhammad is prohibited. Masses of Muslims do not conform to the puritanical 
standards of the extremists and go about life with ease. Many subscribe to highly 
tolerant versions of Sufi Islam.  
The politico-religious elite represented by the ullama, the academia, the 
political dispensation and the armies, be it in Saudi Arabaia, Egypt or Pakistan, all 
have now distanced themselves from the jihadi articulation of Islam. The Wahabis, 
the Azharis and the Deobandis, though essentially conservatives, denounce the jihadi 
interpretations and espousal of violence. There are many possible ways of interpreting 
Islam. The global jihadi version is one particular interpretation that originated in a 
particular theological, geo-political and historical context. But, the issue is why some 
individuals find the jihadi version attractive even when they have many other 
alternative ways of making sense of Islamic faith and identity.  
 
Concluding Considerations 
 
As with all fundamentalist interpretations of faith, or faith-like ideologies, there are 
profound paradoxes and internal-contradictions in the global Jihadi perspective. It 
claims to be based on a direct reading of the sacred texts, unhindered by 
intellectualisation, but requires that it is the interpretation and fatwas issued by Jihadi 
leaders that are to be taken as offering the true meaning of the Quran. The arguments 
are defended by reference to the „sword verses‟ in the Quran, but disregard the „peace 
verses‟.  Many aspects of Western scholarship and science are decried, but those that 
can be directly used for military benefit are accepted. The interpretations of the Quran 
that assigns women and non-believers to inferior status are accepted but the principles 
of Quranic jurisprudence that recognise human rights and equality are ignored.  
Religious objectives are interpreted as geo-political goals.  
 Perhaps of most significance in our secular, non-intellectual age is that the 
arguments for violence and destruction are played out in the rhetoric of religious 
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discussions that are rooted in the interpretation of early mediaeval texts.  The parallels 
to the debates of the Spanish Inquisition, or the Talmudic discussions that laid the 
groundwork for Judaism in the middle-ages, are everywhere to be seen, with the 
exception that those, essentially European debates were founded in a confident 
acceptance that they were the world-order, rather than the search to return to an earlier 
world-order hundreds of years later, which seems to be the essence of present-day 
Jihadism.  
 The general upsurge in fundamentalism across many religions over the last 
quarter of a century, in parallel with the demise of the great atheistic ideologies like 
communism, has been widely documented. It is reflected, to take two well-known 
examples, in the spread of creationism across Christian groups and the growth in 
ultra-orthodox communities in Israel. But what marks the jihadi movement out from 
all of these is its embrace of violence with the aim of comprehensively changing the 
character of the state and the world order into a basically theocratic global system. 
Other religious movements are possibly concerned with transforming individuals or 
even working as an effective pressure group within the system to advance a set of 
policy objectives using peaceful or democratic methods.  The identification of the 
weakness of Arab nations in the face of Western military prowess as being due to a 
lack of following of proper Islamic principles seems to be a crucial aspect of the 
central militancy of the jihadi belief system.  It is interesting to note that those 
Muslim states that are gaining in self-confidence are the ones leading the challenge to 
the rhetoric of the sword verses. 
 Religion has different degrees of impact on day-to-day life in modern society. 
Muslim societies are possibly influenced by region far more than the modern Western 
societies. But, to be religious or even Islamic is one thing; advocating jihad is entirely 
another. We have argued that it is possible for a Muslim to pursue alternative ways of 
understanding Islam while keeping a safe distance from global jihad. The question 
therefore arises as to why the followers of violent jihad apparently accept the 
arguments and fatwas of the activists when many alternatives are open to them? Is the 
answer to be found in some other more personal processes (for example influence of 
tribal customs of taking revenge) that are mediating the interpretations and the 
acceptance?  And are these psychological processes what we should be considering? 
We need to have a clear grasp of the personal as well as rhetorical issues in thinking 
about any process of disengagement.   
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